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The Evolution of Tactics: a Moral Look at the Decision to
Target Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto, Commander in Chief of
Japan’s Combined Fleet

The combat death of enemy leaders is nothing new
to warfare.

Kings such as Harold II of England, Richard

the Lionhearted, Gustavus Adolphus and Charles XII have
fallen in battle. 1

Warfare in the eighteenth and nineteenth

centuries took on an almost gentlemanly nature, if such can
be said about warfare, in which the goal was to defeat the
enemy general’s tactics proving you to be the better
general.

Killing your opponent therefore was not desirable

for anyone can beat a dead man, but if he was alive and
forced to either retreat or surrender then there were no
excuses to be made, you had out maneuvered the enemy.
World War II however, saw something totally new and
foreign to warfare; the blatant and intentional targeting
of an individual by high command with the sole intent of
bringing about his death.

American commanders did not

attempt to capture and interrogate, or possibly take a
hostage to ransom for peace, the only goal was to bring
about the individuals death.

At the time there seems to be

* Shugaku Homma, “Official Portrait,” n.d.
<http://www.history.navy.mil/photos/prs-for/japan/japrs-xz/i-yamto.htm>
(23 May 03).
1
Joseph G. Dawson III, “Targeting Military Leaders: A Historical
Review”, edited by R. Cargill Hall, Lightning Over Bougainville,
Washington D.C.: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1991, 33.

2

little, if any, concern as to the acceptability of such an
action, but years after the event some would begin to
question the use of such tactics.

I suppose it is natural

for it is said, “only when security is safeguarded do
strong moral concerns emerge regarding the rights and wellbeing of outside parties.” 2

It is the intentional targeting

of combat leaders, which are still in use today as
evidenced in execution of the United States lead offensive
in Iraq, that I will discus in this paper.
The mission that fostered such concern is now simply
referred to as the ““Yamamoto Mission””, after the admiral
who was the sole target of the sortie.

Any critical look

at the mission would be incomplete without some
investigation into who the quarry was and how or why he
drew the deadly attention of his adversaries, and a look
into the actual mission itself that gave rise to the
discussion.
In order to answer the question regarding the
acceptability of targeting enemy combat leaders we must
look at two key issues: the legality of the act and the
morality of the action.

Morality is naturally more

complicated to answer than legality, for who decides what
2

Brunk, Gregory and Donald Secrest, Howard Tamashiro.
“Military Views
of Morality and War: An Empirical Study of the Attitudes of Retired
American Officers,” International Studies Quarterly. 34, no.1 (1990):
103.
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is moral?

There is no single set of moral principles

agreed to as there is for the conduct of war.

Instead,

American culture lives according to a moral system much
different from that system which dictates the lives and
actions of the Japanese.

Therefore, this paper concerns

itself only with the morality of the ““Yamamoto Mission””
as viewed by American culture, and leaves the question of
Japanese morality for another to address.
Since the morality of an action in the American moral
system is largely dependent upon the intent we can look to
the possible reasons as to why a commander would order such
an action, Paul Woodruff list three possible motivators for
singling out Yamamoto for death: revenge for Pearl Harbor;
punishment for the war crimes he was ultimately responsible
for; and tactical reasons. 3
Morality and warfare may at first appear to be an
oxymoron to many, and though war is unarguably horrible, it
is not unarguably immoral.

True, there are immoral wars,

just as there are immoral priests, and there are immoral
acts within a “good war”, just as there are immoral acts of
law within any legal system.

If a war is to be moral

however, then the matter in which it is fought must also be

3

Paul B. Woodruff, “Was It Right To Gun For Yamamoto?” edited by R.
Cargill Hall, Lightning Over Bougainville, (Washington D.C.:
Smithsonian Institution Press, 1991), 48.
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moral, the tactics used must champion those values held by
the society in question for by definition when one abandons
their morals they become immoral.

Morality is not a static

ideal; it changes and evolves with individuals and within
society.

Therefore, it is important for a society to

review its past practices from time to time in order to
ensure their moral principles are exemplified in their
actions.

When we evaluate past practices however, it is

imperative to remember not to judge those responsible on
present beliefs, for those beliefs may not have been held
when the action took place.
In order to understand American leaders’ decision to
target Yamamoto we must first familiarize ourselves with
Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto, who he was and why America felt
threatened by his continued existence during the Second
World War.

A brief look into the life of Yamamoto shows a

man who’s mind is constantly at work judging and
anticipating the next move, traits that would make him one
of Japan’s most able naval commanders and thereby one of
America’s most notable adversaries.
Yamamoto was born in 1884 to Takano Sadayoshi, but
following the death of his parents and following a common
Japanese tradition he was adopted by Yamamoto Tatewaki and
renounced his father’s surname.

In 1904 he graduated from

5

Japan’s Naval Academy at Etajima and first saw combat a
year latter at the battle of Japan Sea on board the
Nisshin.

Yamamoto himself was seriously wounded in the

battle when one of the ships guns, stressed by the repeated
firing and the rapid cooling as waves broke over the ships
guns, exploded tearing two fingers from his left hand 4 and
peppering his lower extremities with over one hundred and
twenty fragments. 5
In 1919 he was stationed in the United States for
language study at Harvard University, but failed to attend
class as he was preoccupied studying United States oil
production and American industry traveling from Detroit to
Texas to Mexico. 6

His failure to attend class apparently

did little to effect his academic performance however as he
was a top student of his class. 7 Yamamoto further occupied
his time with special interests in military articles
pertaining to American air arms and their tactics.

It was

during this time that Yamamoto became convinced of the
future role aircraft would play in combat and Japan’s need

4

Hiroyuki Agawa, The Reluctant Admiral: Yamamoto and the Imperial Navy.
(Tokyo: Kodansha International LTD. 1969), 2.
5
Ibid, 65.
6
R. Cargill Hall, Lightning Over Bougainville. (Washington D.C.:
Smithsonian Institution Press, 1991), 4.
7
Thomas G. Lanphier, “I Shot Down Yamamoto,” The Reader’s Digest,
December, 1966, 82-87.
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to develop an air navy, idea’s which he was to push forward
whole heartedly when he returned home to Japan in 1921.
The idea of an air arm was not well received in Japan.
Many senior officers felt that the strength of a nation was
still directly linked to, and symbolized in, battleships. 8
Yamamoto often found himself in violent arguments with
these fellow officers, which required the mediation of
Prince Fushimi, about the future role of aircraft carriers
and the uselessness of battleships. 9

Though Yamamoto’s

dreams of a navy built around aircraft were not to be
realized during his life, his able foresight and
determination are largely responsible for Japan’s ability
to make the Pearl Harbor attack and wage a prolonged war
against the United States.

His then radical ideas are now

considered a matter of logic amongst military strategist. 10
1926 saw the return of Yamamoto to the United States,
this time as the naval attaché to the Japanese embassy in
Washington D.C. 11

Here his overwhelming passion and skill

at gambling first became known to American officers who
taught Yamamoto American games such as: poker, bridge, and
baseball, games he was to love and play for the rest of his
life.
8

Agawa, The Reluctant Admiral: Yamamoto and the Imperial Navy, 91.
Ibid, 92.
10
Ibid, 92-93.
11
R. Cargill Hall, Lightning Over Bougainville. 6.
9
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One could argue that it was this love for games of
chance that formulated Admiral Yamamoto’s strategic
methods.

Hoketsu Kota observed Yamamoto’s tactics to be

characterized by sudden assaults while playing shogi, a
Japanese game resembling chess.

Kota later made the remark

that had America gone into the character of Yamamoto more
carefully prior to the war that we might have guessed the
war would have been launched by a sudden attack. 12
As a Rear Admiral, Yamamoto participated in the London
Naval disarmament conference of 1930, where he
unsuccessfully pushed American and British representatives
for a new treaty that would allow Japan a larger navy.
Yamamoto was again chosen to represent Japan at the 1934
preliminary talks for the London Naval Conference where we
are afforded a look at how Admiral Yamamoto was always
thinking strategically when he spoke in English to American
and British representatives on ordinary matters, but would
use an interpreter on matters of importance.

Yamamoto is

reported to have said, “It takes twice as long when you
have an interpreter, and gives you time to watch the other
man and consider your next move.” 13

12

Hiroyuki Agawa, The Reluctant Admiral: Yamamoto and the Imperial
Navy. 86.
13
Ibid, 36.
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In 1936, against his own desires, Yamamoto was
appointed vice-minister of the navy where he used his
political influence to weed out war hawks in an effort to
use the navy to check “the army’s autocratic methods”
towards war.

14

It was also during this time that Yamamoto,

perhaps unknowingly, predicted America’s future tactics
when he said; “As I see it, naval operations in the future
will consist of capturing an island, then building an
airfield in as short a time as possible… moving up air
units, and using them to gain air and surface control over
the next stretch of ocean.” 15
Yamamoto had always argued against the Tripartite Pact
and war with Britain and the United States. 16

His stubborn

opposition against the Japanese army and these issues
earned him great scorn by many right wing Japanese
statesmen, and resulted in conspiracies to discredit him
and countless death threats.

At least one of which was

proven serious when a man was arrested with a load of
dynamite and claiming he had intended to blow up Yamamoto. 17
In 1939, Yamamoto was reassigned to Commander and
Chief of the Combined Fleet when the signing of the non14

Ibid, 120.
Ibid, 126.
16
Carroll V. Glines. Attack on Yamamoto. (New York: Orion Books, 1990),
49.
17
Hiroyuki Agawa, The Reluctant Admiral: Yamamoto and the Imperial
Navy. 167.
15

9

aggression treaty between Germany and Russia sent shock
waves though the government as Japan felt betrayed by
Germany’s treaty with Japan’s longtime enemy.

The result

was the resignation of the Hiranuma cabinet and Yamamoto’s
reassignment as fear for his life prevented him from
retaining his position.

The fear was not his own however,

for as Yamamoto himself wrote, “To give up his life for his
sovereign and country is the military man’s most cherished
wish: what difference whether he give it up at the front or
behind the lines?” 18
Many similarities can be drawn between Admiral
Yamamoto and the famous American General Robert E. Lee.
Like Lee, Yamamoto strongly opposed war with the United
States and held great respect and admiration for the
American government and its people.

Yamamoto viewed the

fascist governments of Germany and Italy as immoral and
took every opportunity to oppose their unification with
Japan, and saw the error in his own government’s policies
of imperialism and the destructiveness those policies
offered the Japanese people.

Like Lee however, Yamamoto

was a warrior who could not turn against nor abandoned his
own homeland, and so it was with a heavy heart that
Yamamoto, as the newly appointed Commander and Chief,
18

Ibid, 166.
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turned his efforts toward the approaching war with the
United States.
We can not know when exactly Yamamoto began to develop
his plan for the Pearl Harbor attack, but it appears that
it, at least in part, was inspired by an earlier scenario
developed by a Kusaka Ryunosuke in 1927. 19

Kusaka was asked

to give a course in aviation tactics to ten senior officers
of the navy, lacking any idea as to what to lecture about
he developed a theoretical attack via aircraft on Pearl
Harbor.

By 1940, though the plan had been around for

nearly thirteen years, it had never been offered forth as a
plausible scenario until Admiral Yamamoto suggested using
it to open the war against the United States.
The plan for an attack on Pearl Harbor was strongly
resisted by nearly every ranking member of both the Navy
and the Army.

It apparently was too non-conventional for

the senior members of the General Staff.

Yamamoto insisted

however, and even went so far as to threaten to resign if
the plan was not adopted. 20

The plan was adopted and

Yamamoto was on his way to becoming one of Japan’s most
revered heroes.

19
20

Ibid, 193.
Burke Davis, Get Yamamoto (New York: Random House, 1969), 37.
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Pearl Harbor was not his only victory however; Wake,
Dutch Indies, Burma and other Japanese victories were a
product of his able leadership and skilled tactics.

Though

some have criticized his actions at Midway, 21 American
forces then and now have always maintained that it was only
due to a recent brake in the Japanese code that prevented
yet another victory there. 22
By looking at Yamamoto’s life it should be apparent
that this was a man who was always thinking strategically,
as evidence by his conduct at the London Naval disarmament
conference, and very capable of anticipating his enemy’s
tactics, remember he predicted the United States island
hopping campaign.

After six months of repeated defeats at

the hands of Yamamoto 23 it had become apparent to the
American forces that Yamamoto had learned the American
conduct of war well from his time spent in the United
States, 24 and was hindering the American war effort.
On the evening of April 13, 1943 United States code
breakers intercepted a message detailing Admiral Yamamoto’s

21

James C. Ryan, “History may have given Japanese Admiral Isoroku
Yamamoto more credit for military genius than he deserved”,
Perspectives 14, no. 1 (1999): 66-68.
22
Edwin T. Layton, Roger Pineau, and John Costello, And I was There
(New York: William Morrow and company, INC., 1985), 405.
23
Roger H. Beaumont, “Targeting Military Leaders: Another View,” in
Lightning Over Bougainville (Washington D.C.: Smithsonian Institution
Press, 1991), 36.
24
Agawa, The Reluctant Admiral: Yamamoto and the Imperial Navy, 73.
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planed activities for April 18. 25

He was to fly to

Bougainville for an inspection of his front line troops in
an effort to boost morale before “Operation I”.

“Operation

I” was an offensive move to retake the island of
Guadalcanal, 26 which had cost the Marines nearly 4,000
casualties in six months of fighting, 27 and was considered a
necessity by the Japanese for the planned offensive against
Australia. 28
Admiral Nimitz was immediately informed of Yamamoto’s
intention of flying within 400 miles of United States
forces and a discussion began about the possibility of an
intercept mission intended to kill the Japanese Admiral.
Commandeer Edwin T. Layton observed that Yamamoto was
unique in his high standing amongst not only the Japanese
navy but also the Japanese civilian population stating,
“…aside from the Emperor probably no man in Japan is now
more important to civilian morale.

If he were shot down,

it would demoralize their navy… it would stun the nation.” 29
Nimitz however, responded with concern over who would

25

John T. Wible, The “Yamamoto Mission” (The Nimitz Foundation 1988),

7.
26

Agawa, The Reluctant Admiral: Yamamoto and the Imperial Navy, 344.
Frank O. Hough, “Action at Guadalcanal, “Island of Death,” in
Reader’s Digest Illustrated story of World War II Pleasantville, (New
York: The Reader’s Digest Association, INC., 1969), 226.
28
Ibid, 229.
29
John T. Wible. The “Yamamoto Mission”: Sunday April 18, 1943, 9.
27
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replace the Japanese Commander in Chief, 30 for though
Yamamoto was a brilliant strategist there is some value in
knowing your opponent and his strategy.

It was decided

however, that there was no equal to Yamamoto with Layton
saying to Nimitz, “it would be just as if they shot you
down.

There isn’t anybody to replace you.” 31

At the discussions conclusion Nimitz wrote a dispatch
to Admiral Halsey informing him of Yamamoto’s itinerary and
authorizing preliminary planning for a mission to intercept
Yamamoto’s bomber.

Wanting to protect the code broken by

American cryptographers, it was recommended that the
information be attributed to Australian coast watchers
around Rabaul.
Understanding the gravity of the proposed mission and
the possibility of repercussions for targeting so important
a person, Nimitz took care to notify Secretary Knox of the
opportunity at hand and requested authorization for the
mission.

Though there is little written about how

Washington addressed the information it appears that
Secretary Knox questioned the Navy advocate general about
the legality of the mission, 32 and discussed it among
churchmen in regards to the morality of such a blatant
30

E. B. Potter. Nimitz (Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press,
1976), 233.
31
Carroll V. Glines, Attack on Yamamoto, 4.
32
E. B. Potter, Nimitz 233.
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attempt on a specific individuals life.

Though there seems

to be some question as to Presidents Roosevelt’s personal
approval, 33 most sources agree that the President did
authorize the mission. 34

The question had been decided, the

mission was on.
When the mission was being planned and executed Major
Mitchell, the flight leader responsible for the planning
and execution of the mission, thought the chance of success
was about a thousand to one.

The mission required ground

crews to work through the night in order to equip the P38’s with large belly tanks that would supply enough fuel
to travel the more than 400 miles to the target. 35

The

course of travel would have to be over water the entire
length of the journey to avoid detection by Japanese
outpost on nearby islands.

The formation would be required

to fly at wave top height to avoid detection by radar,
using nothing more than a map strapped to the flight
leader’s thigh, a navy compass specially installed in the
lead aircraft, and a wrist watch for timing. 36

The mission

was also seen as a suicide mission, for when Secretary Knox

33

Roger Pineau, “The Code Break” in Lightning Over Bougainville
(Washington D.C.: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1991), 43.
34
E.B. Potter, Nimitz 233., Burke Davis, Get Yamamoto 16. and Carroll
V. Glines, Attack on Yamamoto 9
35
John P. Condon, “Bringing Down Yamamoto,” Proceedings of the United
States Naval Institute 116, no. 11(1988): 88.
36
Carroll V. Glines, Attack on Yamamoto 34.
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had made a visit to Guadalcanal fifty planes were activated
to provide protection for the aircraft carrying the
secretary, it
seemed only
logical that the
Japanese would do
something
similar. 37
To compound
the problem of so
long an

38

interception, the
American pilots
had to estimate
the aircraft
flown by the
Japanese (there
were two
different types
39of

bombers

available with different top speeds), the course of flight,
speed and weather in order to approximate a time and place
37

Carroll V. Glines, “Whose Kill Was It,” Aviation, May 1993, 44.
Hall, Lightning Over Bougainville, 21.
39
Hall, Lightning Over Bougainville, 21.
38
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to intercept.

Should the American plane arrive to early

the prey would be spooked and enemy fighters could scramble
to intercept, too late and the target would be on the
ground and nearly impossible to distinguish.

Looking back,

Major Mitchell has decided a million to one odds was
probably more accurate.
Despite the overwhelming odds the mission was a
stunning success and earned its place in history as the
longest aerial intercept in history. 40

Of the eighteen

fighters to depart that morning only two encountered
problems and had to abort (only one was related to the
newly installed belly tanks).

No fighters were waiting to

escort the admiral’s bomber, and though the American
fighters only expected one bomber there were two to contend
with and both were eliminated. 41

Only one American pilot,

40

John P. Condon, “Brining Down Yamamoto,” Proceedings of the United
States Naval Institute, 116,
no. 11 (1988): 86.
41
Two pilots have laid claim to the downing of the aircraft carrying
Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto; Thomas G. Lanphier and Rex Barber. Lanphier
claims that after downing a Zero he flipped over onto his back and
noticed Barber fighting off a mess of Zeros, at the same instant he
spotted a bomber moving low across the jungle trying to escape.
Lanphier states he became “Very stubborn about making the most of the
one good shot I had coming up.” This is interesting also for in all of
Lanphier’s accounts he is engaging the bomber from 70 degrees, “an
impossible angle to hit anything”, and “a lucky” shot to use his own
words. So much for making the best of the one good chance, by his own
admission he never had a good chance.
In another account he states that knowing he was out of range
from the bomber he checked his guns in the bombers direction, he did
not fire the P-38’s canon and yet the right engine started to burn and
then broke away from the bomber causing the bomber to flip into the
jungle. What catches the eye here is the checking of the guns. A
World War II fighter plane was very limited in ammunition, carrying

17

Raymond K. Hine, failed to return, 42 and most importantly,
the Japanese never linked the attack to a code break. 43
Tens of thousands of mourners turned out for
Yamamoto’s funeral, 44 and though the Japanese people were
stunned by his death there appears to have been little
discussion about the acceptability of the events
surrounding his death.

It took forty-five years before the

morality of the mission was questioned at a symposium held
to honor the events of that April day. 45
Joseph G. Dawson shows us that there is little
evidence of targeting specific individuals for death in
wars previous to the 20th century, and even cites an example
where the Duke of Wellington forbids his artillerymen from

approximately only four hundred rounds. The significance of the
carrying capacity of a fighter plane is that an experienced fighter
pilot does not check his guns, which wastes ammo, after already
shooting down an enemy aircraft.
Barber’s version is quite different, he states that a banking
movement meant to line Barber up with the bombers caused him to loose
sight of one of the bombers. Not knowing which bomber Yamamoto was in,
they had only planed on one, Barber engaged and closed with the one
remaining bomber. He states that he fired into the right engine of the
bomber and moved to the left through the fuselage of the bomber to the
left engine and back again to the center of the fuselage. At about the
time he centered his fire on the fuselage the plane slowed and came up
on one wing. When Barber broke off his engagement the Bomber had
leveled off and was rapidly descending in smoke. Barber has never made
a claim that he actually witnessed the bomber go down.
The controversy was officially settled by splitting the credit
between the two pilots, but for those who care to investigate there is
still plenty of evidence available to prove that only one is deserving
of the credit.
42
Burk Davis, Get Yamamoto, 172.
43
Hiroyuki Agawa, The Reluctant Admiral: Yamamoto and the Imperial
Navy, 369.
44
Ibid, 391.
45
Hall, Lightning Over Bougainville, xv.
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firing on Napoleon when the chance arose at the battle of
Waterloo. 46

On the other hand, Roger Beaumont tells us how

this trend began to change in the 20th century, citing such
examples of the British commando attempt on Field Marshal
Rommel.

Woodruff and Davenport however, argue the morality

of targeting Yamamoto.

Woodruff argues that American

intent was to bring the war to an end as soon as possible
and that it was believed that the death of Admiral Yamamoto
would help to do this and therefore America’s decision was
morally acceptable.

Davenport generally agrees with

Woodruff but draws the opposite conclusion, because he
believes Yamamoto’s contributions after the war would have
been great, yet they were denied by this act.
The shift in World War II to elaborate camouflage
schemes for command-and-control centers, and both Churchill
and Hitler’s time spent in underground bunkers acknowledge
the known risk of leadership.

The French forces even went

so far as to cease using radios in command-and-control
units in order to not attract enemy air attack while the
United States specifically targeted suspected German
headquarters.
The attack on Yamamoto was in no way unique to World
War II except in its success.
46

British commandos acting on

Dawson, “Targeting Military Leaders: A Historical Review,” 35.
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information gleaned from an Arab informant attempted to
eliminate Field Marshal Rommel on the 17th of November, 1941
on a mission that required the commandos be launched from a
submarine, move 15-20 miles inland by cover of darkness and
speak German to bait a guard to open a door.

The guard

resisted however and nearly all the commando’s involved
where either killed or captured.

As it would turn out,

Rommel had used the building only once as his headquarters,
and, in any event, had been in Rome at the time of the
attack. 47

However, those captured were treated quite well, 48

indicating nothing spectacular was thought of the effort
for if the attempt had been perceived as criminal then
Germany would have been free to prosecute the offenders
regardless of their military status.
Rommel was nearly killed on the 17th of July 1944 when
a spitfire, piloted by Canadian Charley Fox, spotted a
staff car traveling at high speeds along a road. 49

Fox’s

attack caused the staff car to crash, injuring Rommel.
Though it was not known who was in the vehicle and it was a
chance encounter, the attack on a staff car can only have

47

Charles Messenger, The Commandos: 1940-1946. (London: William Kimber
& Co. Limited, 1985), 114.
48
Ibid, 39
49
Roger A. Beaumont, “Targeting Military Leaders: Another View,” in
Lightning Over Bougainville (Washington D.C.: Smithsonian Institution
Press), 38-39.
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one purpose, to kill the occupants, and privates do not
ride in staff cars except as drivers.
Yamamoto himself must have understood the danger
associated with being the commander in chief for on the
morning he boarded the bomber for that fateful flight he
donned his dark green uniform, which he rarely wore,
instead of the white dress uniform he nearly always wore. 50
There can be no doubt that the shift of decapitating enemy
forces by removing the command element when possible was in
full swing during World War II.
We have seen that the practice of targeting military
leaders was in fact in effect during World War II, but does
this mean the “Yamamoto Mission” was morally justified, or
was it simply following an immoral trend?

Here I turn your

attention first to legality and then towards morality.
However, let us discuss briefly the difference between
legality and morality.
Laws are created as an official means of governing the
actions of the citizens which live under the jurisdiction
of that set of laws and a machine for addressing those
individuals who violate them.

Morality on the other hand

provides individuals and societies with a set of ideals

50

Hiroyuki Agawa, The Reluctant Admiral: Yamamoto and the Imperial
Navy, 347.
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seen as to be inherently a part of humanity by a particular
group.

There are several key differences here.

Law

directly address specific issues i.e., who has the right of
way at an intersection, whereas morality provides a concept
that address non-specific issues such as allowing an
elderly woman with a heavy burden to pass in front of you
at the check out line.

Laws can not possibly address every

dispute that could arise; they only seek to address those
most likely to arise.

Where laws fail to provide guidance

it is expected that individuals will turn toward their
moral compass.
The laws of war do not prohibit the targeting of
generals and admirals; in fact the killing of soldiers is
nearly always permissible, unless they lay down their
weapons in which case it is always illegal. 51

In fact, the

underlying concept in the laws of war is military
necessity, 52 meaning that even those things prohibited by
the laws of war, such as the killing of civilians, are
permissible if they are a matter of military necessity.

In

other words if a town is held by the enemy, and the only
means to secure the town will result in civilian casualties
then it is permissible to inflict those casualties.

This

51

Douglas P. Lackey, The Ethics of War and Peace (Englewood Cliffs, New
Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1989),
66.
52
Sheldon M. Cohen, Arms and Judgment (Boulder: Westview Press, 1989),
6.
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is perhaps unsettling for many, and it indeed should be,
for military necessity is a slippery slope, but this goes
beyond the scope of this paper.

The other side to the coin

however, is that if the military objectives can be
accomplished with out securing the town then not only is it
illegal to kill the civilians, it becomes illegal to kill
the soldiers within the town (as long as they do not
attempt to engage the opposing army).
Yamamoto was the commander in chief of the combined
fleet of Japan and viewed by American commanders as the
best commander available to the Japanese.

The goal of

American commanders, as we will see, was to bring the war
to a close as quickly as possible and it was believed that
the death of Yamamoto would help to achieve such a speedy
end.

Under the laws of war then and now, the mission to

kill Yamamoto was a legal act of war.
As stated earlier however, there are instances where
what is legal is not moral.

It may be legal to sue your

wife for injuring your son in a car accident, knowing the
insurance will pay the settlement, but most would agree it
is not moral.

Is it possible that the “Yamamoto Mission”

falls under this category?
but immoral?

Was it legal to kill Yamamoto,

Woodruff says we must look to intent to

determine the morality of the mission and list three

23

possible motivations for killing Yamamoto; revenge,
punishment and tactical. 53
The question of revenge is complicated by the natural
possession of it by combatants.

Battle cries have been

used for centuries in combat, often times these cries are
of people or places which represent a great loss for the
army.

Battle cries are meant to stir up emotion, to anger

the troops so that their thirst for revenge will inspire
heroic efforts which will carry them to victory.
Yamamoto’s prominent role in the Japanese Navy and as the
mastermind of Pearl Harbor made him a natural target of
vengeance, and in fact revenge was a factor for both the
pilots and the commanders involved in the “Yamamoto
Mission”. 54

In fact Besby Holmes, one of the pilots in the

killer section, was in church that Sunday morning at Pearl
Harbor when the bombs began to fall, and was in the air
within a half an hour of the start of the attack, but by
then the planes were gone. 55

We can only assume that Mr.

Holmes lost friends that day, and having been selected to
attack Yamamoto must have been very satisfying to his
natural thirst for retribution.

However, being that Holmes

was not a part of the decision to target Yamamoto his

53
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motivations can not be used to judge the mission as
immoral.

The motivations of the decision makers are what

dictates the morality of the mission, for targeting
military leaders solely for the purpose of revenge is in
fact unethical; however, as we will see, revenge was a
secondary benefit to the pilots and commanders of a
tactical mission.
It has been argued that Admiral Yamamoto was
considered a war criminal by many prominent Americans
responsible for waging the war against Japan, 56 and
therefore deserving of punishment.

But was he a war

criminal, and if so what made him so?

Was it his lethal

attack on Pearl Harbor, or some other heinous crime less
known to the American people?

If he was a war criminal is

punishment a legitimate motivator for his targeting?
Pearl Harbor was attacked the morning of December 7,
1941 with out a declaration of war from Japan.

The obvious

response from my opponents would be that we all know that
Japan had intended to deliver a formal declaration of war
to the United States prior to the attack, but that
confusion resulted in the attack occurring prior to the
declaration of war. 57

56
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is that we must keep in mind that what we know today can
not be used to judge the men of yesterday.

It seems

apparent that when the declaration of war was delivered
that the natural course of events would have lead to the
discovery that Japan had intended to declare war prior to
the attack and that it was a simple and understandable
mistake.

This would seem to negate an argument of

ignorance, but does it?

We must keep in mind that America

had just lost thousands of lives due to an unexpected
attack.

How could we expect our leaders to believe our

newly sworn enemies that it was an accident?
Let us however, entertain the idea that the
declaration of war had been delivered prior to the bombs
exploding as planned, would this have changed the idea that
the attack was illegal and immoral?
The Japanese navy, headed by Admiral Yamamoto,
knowingly set into action a sequence of events that would
result in the death and destruction of United States
personnel and property during a time of peace with full
knowledge and intent of deceiving the United States by
using to their advantage the current state of peace between
the United States and Japan.

The Japanese government even

went so far as to continue peace talks with the United
States while they readied and positioned their war ships to

26

attack Pearl Harbor.

The intent here was obvious, to keep

the United States unprepared to defend itself while the
Japanese fleet readied itself to destroy the American
Pacific Fleet.

I argue that the attack on Pearl Harbor

took place the moment the Japanese fleet left port for
Hawaii.
Law and morality both make exceptions to nearly any
rule however, and it may be that one exists here.

Though

Japan did intentionally deceive America so as to enable
them to crush our fleet we must understand that it was not
without provocation.

Finding Japan’s aggressiveness

unfavorable the United States began to apply pressure to
dissuade Japan from its imperialistic advances.

When Japan

failed to concede, and joined Germany and Italy in the
Tripartite Pact the United States refused to sell Japan oil
and steel which Japan desperately needed for its war
machine, 58 and of which Japan received eighty percent of its
consumption from the United States. 59

In effect, Japan had

been backed into the proverbial corner and saw no way out
but to fight a vastly superior force.

A force that had

used its political and industrial might to ensure its own
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superiority. 60

Japan’s only hope was a surprise attack that

would annihilate the American Pacific Fleet and Yamamoto
understood this.
It may be difficult to say with certainty whether the
attack on Pearl Harbor was criminal or not, but it was with
out a doubt questionable.

What should leave no confusion

however was Japan decision to attack the barracks housing
the pilots of American fighter planes.

The laws of war

since the time of the Hague convention, which Japan signed
in 1899, 61 have specifically prohibited the use of force
against unarmed persons both civilian and military.

The

men in the barracks being fighter pilots had no weapons
available to them in which they could return fire of any
sort and therefore ceased to be combatants and legitimate
targets of war.
As the commander of the Japanese navy and the master
mind of Pearl Harbor, Admiral Yamamoto was personally
responsible for targeting the pilots’ barracks thereby
making Admiral Yamamoto a war criminal.

Furthermore, as

the case of General Tomoyuki Yamashita points out,
commanders are ultimately responsible for the crimes of the
men under their command.
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General Yamashita, being found guilty of war crimes
when his men executed prisoners of war as United States
forces recaptured the Philippines, appealed to the United
States Supreme Court claiming that he had not ordered or
committed any war crimes.

Yamashita argued that due to the

chaotic conditions of combat he had lost contact with his
troops and was only in effective command of the troops in
his presence and was therefore not responsible for the
actions of his troops.

The Supreme Court refused to hear

his case stating:
“It is evident that the conduct of military
operations by troops whose excesses are unrestrained
by the orders or efforts of their commanders would
almost certainly result in violations which it is the
purpose of the law of war to prevent…Its purpose...
would be largely defeated if the commander of an
invading army could with impunity neglect to take
reasonable measures for their protection.

Hence the

law of war presupposes that its violation is to be
avoided through the control of the operations of war
by commanders who are to some extent responsible for
their subordinates.” 62
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The Tokyo tribunal stated that commanders were not only
responsible for failing to act upon known crimes committed
by their men, but for failing to know what their troops are
doing, Yamashita was hanged for his crimes.

Therefore,

following the case of Yamashita, Admiral Yamamoto was
ultimately responsible for all of the atrocities committed
by naval personnel from the date of his appointment as
commander and chief to the day of his death.
As Mr. Woodruff argues however, no act of war is
justified by the mere fact that an individual is guilty of
a crime.

Though Yamamoto was indeed a war criminal by the

standards of the time, he was also entitled to a trial, a
trial that Admiral Halsey looked forward to and was angered
to be denied. 63

It may seem odd to speak of morality and

war, but the simple fact is that war exists and we have the
power to make it more or less moral.

In order to make it

more moral, we need to preserve those values and morals
being fought for.

This means that we must try war

criminals when possible, not chase them down and execute
them, therefore, if the intent of the mission was to punish
a war criminal than the “Yamamoto Mission” would have been
immoral.
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Yamamoto was a brilliant and successful commander
whose men idolized him, 64 and was revered by his countrymen
in a god like fashion. 65

His brilliant planning had nearly

wiped out the American Pacific fleet in Pearl Harbor, and
may have very well destroyed what was left at Midway had it
not been for the fortunate breaking of the Japanese code.
Wake, the Dutch Indies and Burma were other Japanese
victories accomplished by Yamamoto’s spectacular
leadership. 66

There can be no question that the removal of

Yamamoto from command of the Japanese Navy served a
definite purpose for the American war effort, and in fact
this is what was considered before the order was given to
strike. 67
Given that the primary motivator was the removal of an
effective command element whose existence was believed to
be prolonging the war the “Yamamoto Mission” was in fact
ethical, because its chief aim was to shorten the duration
of the war thus saving lives.

Further, even those who

morally object to war must concede that when faced with two
evils it would immoral not to choose the lesser of the two
evils.

Though intentionally killing an individual may be

viewed as immoral by some, allowing that individual to live
64
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at the expense of thousands, perhaps millions of others is
even more immoral.
Though Davenport agrees that the primary motivation
for targeting Yamamoto was not punishment or revenge and
that it was in fact motivated by tactical considerations he
does not believe the mission was ethical.

Davenport argues

that war should be fought in such a manner as to preserve
the values being championed, 68 but he fails to make any
strong connection of failed values to the “Yamamoto
Mission”.

He argues that the targeting of high ranking

military officials set a precedent that had the result of
pushing leadership back from the battle lines leaving
critical decisions to junior officers on the ground thereby
increasing the difficulty of conducting effective warfare.
In other words, setting a precedent that did us more longterm harm than short-term good.
Critical combat decisions however, were made by junior
ranking officers previous to the “Yamamoto Mission”.

As

far back as the American Civil War critical combat
decisions have been made by junior officers.

Joshua

Lawrence Chamberlain, commander of the 20th Main at the
battle of Gettysburg, made the critical decision to mount

68
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bayonets and charge the enemy when his troops had expended
their ammunition and were about to be overrun.

The end

result, the enemy was so stunned by this maneuver that they
either dropped their weapons and surrendered, or turned and
ran thus saving the union forces from being flanked.

Where

were the commanding General and his senior officers?

They

were located in a position believed to be relatively safe
from enemy fire.
The “Yamamoto Mission” did not push commanders back
from the front, technological advances such a frequency
jumping radios and other real-time communication devices
have pushed the commanders back.

The argument that the

“Yamamoto Mission” negatively altered the command of troops
in battle does not hold water.
A second argument brought forth by Mr. Davenport
against the morality of targeting Yamamoto is the
contributions Yamamoto could have brought to the peace
table.

He points out the fact that Yamamoto had been

against any war with America from the start, 69 and had even
gone so far as to put his life in danger through his peace
keeping efforts. 70

It is unclear however, how much of

Yamamoto’s efforts at peace were known by the United
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States, if any, prior to the wars conclusion.

Without the

knowledge of Yamamoto’s efforts he simply became a great
enemy tactician that was hindering the American effort and
needed to be removed.

If Yamamoto’s efforts had been known

to American forces his removal from command can still be
justified, for America’s current relationship with Japan
proves the admiral’s presence was not needed to rebuild the
nation and develop strong ties between the United States
and Japan.
Davenport also raises the concern of reinforcing
Japanese soldiers resolve in defeating America by killing
such a revered leader.

Hiroyuki Agawa tells us the death

of Yamamoto had quite the opposite affect stating that,
“Both for navy men and the general public, Yamamoto’s death
was a source not only of deep grief but of anxiety about
the future course of the war.” 71

The killing of Yamamoto

not only removed a threat but also destroyed the morale of
the enemy both at home and in the trenches while serving as
a motivational boost to American forces.

Yamamoto’s death

also ended Japanese hopes of recapturing Guadalcanal,
thereby preventing a Japanese offensive on Australia; at
least two entire battles were prevented by his death.

71
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The Morality of war changes with time.

Once it was

not only permissible to rape the women, loot and burn the
villages, it was considered one of the spoils of victory
and was the means of payment for the services of the
troops.

Today that manner of warfare is not condoned and

in fact can draw the fury of other nations.
war was a matter of attrition.

In the past

Today however, enemies

killed in action is less important, instead we target
factories, ammo dumps, fuel supplies, and as the “Yamamoto
Mission” shows, effective enemy leaders, Admiral Yamamoto
was such a leader.
Yamamoto was a leader who effectively used the
information gleaned from his time spent in the United
States to wage a costly war.

Yamamoto was a leader whose

repeated success drew the attention of his adversaries who,
when afforded the opportunity, decided to remove this
threat in a manner sanctioned by the laws of war.

The

decision was made not as a form punishment for the war
crimes Yamamoto was responsible for as the commander in
chief of Japan’s navy, and not out of revenge for the
spilling of American blood.

The decision to kill Yamamoto

was made because he was seen as the enemy’s most able
strategist, one Japan could not afford to loose and one
America could not allow remaining in control.
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Hindsight is twenty-twenty, and we have come to learn
the Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto was not the evil “Jap”
portrayed in the American propaganda effort of World War
II, but instead was a compassionate, intelligent man who
loved America.

Yamamoto was highly respected by his

countrymen, and could have aided our reconstruction efforts
greatly.

We can not however, make the decision of who

lives and who dies in war based from the possibilities of
their future contributions.

The man in a machine gun nest

is targeted not because he has less to contribute to the
peace table than the cook in the mess tent, but because the
machine gunner is a greater threat.

Likewise, Yamamoto was

a greater threat as commander in chief of Japan’s combined
fleet, than he was an asset to the peace table.

That is

what determined his fate, and that is why the “Yamamoto
Mission” is morally acceptable.
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